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EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
AUTHORITY TO TAKE
The distinction between expropriation and appropriation
continues to be an important one since there has been no legis-
lative action requiring payment of more than the assessed
value for lands taken for levee construction under circumstan-
ces qualifying the taking as an appropriation.1 In the absence
of legislative action the courts, however, have continued to
narrow the circumstances in which such partially uncompen-
sated takings can occur. In Stevenson v. Board of Levee
Commissioners, 2 the court decided that to qualify for appropri-
ation the property must not only have been riparian when sepa-
rated from the public domain and the taking within the range
of the reasonable necessities of a situation produced by the
forces of nature, unaided by artificial causes, but the taking for
levee construction also "must be necessary for the control of
flood waters from the river to which the land taken is ri-
parian."3 The additional gloss on article 665 of the Civil Code
was inferred from a holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court in
1959 that to be "within the range of the reasonable necessities
of the situation" there must be a showing that the purpose for
which the property was taken was related to control of the flood
waters of the river to which the lands taken were riparian.4 In
the instant case the levee construction was intended to hold off
backwaters from several streams, not just backwaters from the
stream to which the lands taken were riparian; thus the taking
was deemed not an appropriation but an expropriation for
which the owner must be compensated at the fair market value
of the land involved.5
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The way was opened for the payment of just compensation by LA. CONST. art.
VI, § 42, which states that levee takings are to be paid for "as provided by law."
2. 353 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
3. A. K. Roy, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 237 La. 541, 111 So. 2d 765 (1959).
4. Id. at 543, 111 So. 2d at 768.
5. 353 So. 2d at 460-61.
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The idea of limiting the power of the public authorities to
compel uncompensated contributions to the general welfare via
the police power is not subject to even-handed application,
however, even within the same appellate jurisdiction. In
McPherson v. Catahoula Parish Police Jury,' there were no
similar comforting restraints imposed upon the taking of a new
servitude of public road from a riparian owner as authorized by
article 707 of the Civil Code. Not only was the riparian owner
required to yield a new servitude for the one eroded by the
river, but he was required to provide, without adequate com-
pensation, a servitude twice the width of the old one. While
prior supreme court jurisprudence had already discarded the
limitation that such uncompensated takings be for a road or
passage incident to the nature, navigable character, or use of
the stream,7 a new servitude for general road purposes might
well have been held to be subject to adequate compensation,
at least as to the land taken which exceeded the area of the
existing servitude, as the dissent suggested. Special damages
such as damages to crops suffered as an incident to the new
construction were, however, held compensable.8
While the authority to take property and property rights
for controlled-access facilities and service roads is clear under
the highway quick-taking statute,' the agency must be puncti-
lious in its description of what is taken. Thus, in State v.
Trichel,10 the court was unwilling to imply a taking of access
rights from a tract abutting an access road where such an outlet
was not specifically included in the court order of taking. The
case was remanded for further proceedings, including fixing
any severance damage incident to loss of access by the remain-
der tract."
DAMAGES
The new constitution significantly expanded the concept
6. 358 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
7. Hornsby v. State, 241 La. 989, 996-97, 132 So. 2d 871, 874 (1961).
8. 358 So. 2d at 688.
9. LA. R.S. 48:301-04 (1950).
10. 348 So. 2d 1260 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
11. Id. at 1262.
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of compensation by adding to the expropriation provision the
requirement that "the owner shall be compensated to the full
extent of his loss . . .12 The phrase has not been interpreted
by the Louisiana Supreme Court nor have additional damages
been awarded by reason of these words. Two appellate courts,
however, have announced that they accept the phrase as in-
tended to enlarge the scope of recovery by an owner. Specifi-
cally, one court noted in State v. Constant,3 "the provision
envisions recovery for business losses, moving expenses and
other intangibles in a proper case and upon adequate proof of
such losses."" Another appellate court, in State v.
Champagne,3 considered the "intent of the redactors of the
1974 constitution to be that once the landowner has received
compensation in an amount sufficient to place him in as good
a position pecuniarily as he would have been, had his property
not been taken, the landowner has received compensation 'to
the full extent of his loss.""'
In safeguarding the public fisc against unnecessary awards
in expropriation cases, dedication, either statutory, by declara-
tion, or by informal act, plays an important role. In Namie v.
State, 7 the state countered a claim for damages for trespass in
conjunction with the construction of drainage facilities with
the argument that there had been no trespass since the area
had already been dedicated. The state's argument was rejected
on the ground that, while a plat showing the alleged road and
right of way was introduced in evidence, the actual road was
not located as per the plat; the owner's deed, which indicated
no dedication of a right of way but only the paved surface of
the road as the monument for the surveyor's call, was deemed
to govern and to support the claim of damages for trespass.
In City of New Orleans v. Giraud, '1 the location of a zoning line
12. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
13. 359 So. 2d 666, 672 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
14. Id. at 672.
15. 356 So. 2d 1136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
16. Id. at 1140.
17. 353 So. 2d 1095 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
18. Id. at 1097-99.
19. 346 So. 2d 1113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
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demarcating residential from commercial usage was crucial to
the determination of severance damages as well as the award
for land taken. The city appraiser located the zoning line on a
point to point, or monument to monument, basis whereas the
owner's appraiser used a scale method and relied on the dist-
ances dictated by the zoning map; the latter method resulted
in a substantial enhancement of the commercial area affected.
The court was persuaded that the scale method was more in
keeping with the zoning practice of following street right-of-
ways; an ordinance would be required to correct any errors on
the official zoning map." In State v. Traina,2' the state sought
a reduction of an award for severance damages by invoking a
recent statute2  specifying the dimensions of right of way in
informal acquisitions from local bodies where there was no pre-
vious record of dedication. The 1976 statute was not given ret-
roactive effect, however, since the court held that it was not
clearly remedial or procedural in nature.
In the Giraud case the taking included deprivation of ac-
cess to a substantial amount of property frontage, and sever-
ance damages were claimed to provide for other means of ac-
cess to the land; such "cost to cure" damages were limited to
the value of the property prior to taking, thus avoiding an
award of damages in excess of 100 percent of the value of the
property.3 The Third Circuit also recognized the "cost to cure"
principle in State v. Alexandria Volkswagen, Inc.,24 but re-
jected as double compensation a claim for damages necessary
to restore parking spaces which had already been paid for as
improvements taken in the expropriation.25
The state may also minimize severance damages, although
not an award for taking, by proving the creation of special
benefits by an improvement; there may not, however, be any
transference of such benefits. Thus, in State v. A. Wilbert's
20. Id. at 1116.
21. 347 So. 2d 55 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
22. LA. R.S. 48:220.1 (Supp. 1976).
23. 346 So. 2d at 1119.
24. 348 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
25. Id. at 178-79.
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Sons Lumber and Shingle Co., 2 reduction of severance dam-
ages to one tract was successfully resisted by showing that the
special benefits sought to be applied inured only to a second
tract and that two tracts separated by a bayou were not in the
requisite single use essential to treatment as a unit.27 An inter-
vening lessee made no claim to lease advantage but only to
damages for the state's failure to restore a fence; the claim was
rejected as relating only to damage to the lease, not to the
subject tract, hence a claim in tort which must be separately
litigated.2 8 On the other hand, in State v. Turpin,21 special
benefits were readily recognized to each of two tracts, which
resulted from a taking which split one land-locked tract into
two portions, because the taking was for a highway which pro-
vided frontage on a paved highway for the two tracts with a
resultant substantial increase in market value as "suburban
acreage" rather than rural pasture land. 0 The burden of prov-
ing special benefits must, of course, be fully carried by the
expropriator. An upward adjustment in a remainder merely
because it is within the quadrant of an interchange may be
dismissed as arbitrary unless, as was noted in State v.
Anderson,3 the expropriator satisfactorily proves that the re-
mainder within the quadrant is now superior to other compet-
ing sites in the area in volume of traffic, availability to motor-
ists leaving the expressway, visibility to motorists approaching
the exit ramp, and accessibility to and from the expressway
and to nearby population centers.32
In State v. Country Club Acres, Inc.,33 severance damages
were eliminated in a taking from a subdivision when the court
was persuaded that two remainders could be recombined into
a lot as attractive as those untouched by the taking. The
owner's appraiser fell into the rather egregious error of giving
26. 346 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
27. Id. at 844-45, citing State v. Cefalu, 288 So. 2d 332 (La. 1974).
28. Id. at 845-46, citing State v. Mouledous, 199 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 250 La. 934, 199 So. 2d 927 (1967).
29. 348 So. 2d 135 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
30. Id. at 137.
31. 356 So. 2d 1086 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
32. Id. at 1089.
33. 348 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
797
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
an opinion that a lot which had been diminished in size by
seven and one-half percent was thereby damaged to a similar
degree in remainder value. The court thought it "double com-
pensation" to give judgment for an award and damages of the
same amount; yet diminishing a lot so as to render it no longer
salable as a full-sized lot would seem to be clearly compensable
in some amount as an addition to an award for the area ac-
tually taken."
As a general rule, when there has been no taking of prop-
erty, no compensation may be had for damage caused by traffic
regulation, since this is usually termed an exercise of the police
power; however, where a portion of the property has been
taken, as for a street-widening and construction of a median
divider, damages caused by the resulting limited access will be
awarded. 5 Thus, it was held, in State v. Hoyt, 36 that damages
must a fortiori be awarded where a street was not only widened
but also rendered one-way, with traffic in the opposite direc-
tion channelled over a street some distance away from the sub-
ject service station tract which was rendered substantially less
accessible.
VALUATION
No reversible error was deemed to have occurred in State
v. Brannon,7 by virtue of the trial court's acceptance of an
appraisal based on one comparable sale, where the transaction
used was deemed "more reasonably and factually applicable"
than other sales in evidence. Nor was there error in relying
upon sales made after the taking "as a check on the before
taking sales used as comparables. ' '38
State v. Dyess" is illustrative of an astute, though unsuc-
cessful, attempt to strengthen a claim for a larger award by
utilizing new procedural safeguards surrounding the taking of
34. M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 98 (1970).
35. Id. at 125. See also M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 34, at 47 n.365.1 (Supp.
1978).
36. 357 So. 2d 1189 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
37. 348 So. 2d 1301 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
38. Id. at 1303.
39. 350 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
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a default judgment. 0 Where, at the time of original taking, the
possible construction of a shopping mall was mere rumor and
was deemed not to affect value, counsel allowed his reconven-
tional demand for a higher award to lie unprosecuted for five
years; upon dismissal without prejudice, and presumably
within ten days of notice from the state that it was moving for
judgment, counsel refiled his reconventional demand for an
award based on the higher values posited by the actuality of
the mall development and was permitted to try the issue.4' In
Dyess there was no issue of rezoning; however, where the state
seeks to counter severance damages to a remainder with an
opinion that the tract could be rezoned commercial, the opin-
ion will be rejected unless there is evidence to buttress it, as
was not the case in State v. C. F. Breaux Investment Co. 42
State v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. 41
involved a taking of a railroad right of way; the court noted that
"[e]stablishing just compensation for a taking of special use
property is difficult . . . [and] no single exclusive approach
. . . must be applied by appraisers or by the court."44 So say-
ing, the court affirmed the trial court's acceptance of commer-
cial value as highest and best use with a discount of almost fifty
percent because of the presence of the railroad tracks.45 What
might seem a more equitable approach was used for a similar
taking in State v. New Orleans Terminal Co.,41 where the value
was fixed on the basis of the highest and best use of the land
for which the railroad would have to pay if it were acquiring
the land by expropriation.
PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF
The private expropriator continues to have more cost-free
flexibility in changing plans for expropriation than does the
40. LA. R.S. 48:452 (Supp. 1978).
41. See State v. Ott, 262 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972). For comments on
State v. Ott and LA. R.S. 48:452 (Supp. 1974) and 48:452.1 (Supp. 1974), see M. DAKIN
& M. KLEIN, supra note 34, at 101 n.172.1 and 104 n.213.2 (Supp. 1978).
42. 351 So. 2d 1321 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
43. 357 So. 2d 1224 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978),
44. Id. at 1225.
45. Id.
46. 319 So. 2d 568 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
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public agency. In Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp. v. LeDoux,17
the expropriator was held not liable for attorney fees where
proceedings were abandoned because construction of a pro-
posed pipeline became unnecessary. Neither the 1972 statute41
providing attorney fees in the event of abandonment by a pub-
lic agency (which the court refused to extend by analogy) nor
the language of the 1974 constitution, "that the owner shall be
compensated to the full extent of his loss" but which applies
only when property is taken or damaged, was deemed to pro-
vide relief." On the other hand, where there is a taking and no
tender of the true value of the property has been made in
connection therewith, the court will, as in Louisiana Intrastate
Gas Corp. v. McIntire,50 award reasonable expert fees, "based
on the relative usefulness of. . .testimony";"' but preparation
time spent in consultation with counsel will not be compen-
sated.52 However, in Louisiana Resources Co. v. Fiske,11 the
absence of a tender was not determinative where the evidence
established that written offers in excess of the court awards
were made but tender would not have been accepted by the
landowners. The court noted approvingly that "jurisprudence
in our state conforms with the universal rule of law to the effect
that a formal tender is not required where it would be of no
avail. . . .[T]he law does not require anyone to do a vain and
useless thing."" Since 1974, the legislature has also provided
that, in addition to conventional costs, including the fees of
experts, failure to make an adequate tender may support an
47. 347 So. 2d 4 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
48. LA. R.S. 19:201 (Supp. 1978).
49. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
50. 349 So. 2d 1331 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
51. Id. at 1333. See Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp. v. Guidry, 357 So. 2d 830,
831-32 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), where psychologist's fee, as a part of costs, was denied
because the testimony was not mentioned in the trial court's reasons for judgment, a
circumstance which was deemed tantamount to a denial of the demand.
52. 349 So. 2d at 1333.
53. 356 So. 2d 110 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
54. Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. Bullis, 197 La. 14,18, 200 So. 805, 806 (1941).
See South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Marsh Investment Corp., 344 So. 2d 6, 7-8
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), commented on in M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 34, at
105 n.227.3 (Supp. 1978).
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award of attorney fees to the landowner.15 Thus, in Claiborne
Electric Cooperative, Inc., v. Garrett," it was held that, with-
out doing violence to the statute, "landowners are entitled to
reasonable attorney fees in any case in which the highest
amount offered is less than that obtained through. . . judicial
assertion of their rights."5 However, in Louisiana Intrastate
Gas Corp. v. Guidry," where the only significant issue was
severance damages, the use of "may" in the statute warranted
denial of the fee as within the discretion of the court.
The state has been held rather rigidly to the rule that
amendments to pleadings must be in writing and that evidence
of lesser severance damages than contained in the declaration
of taking will be inadmissible as an unpermitted enlargement
of the pleadings." However, it was held, in State v. Smith,'"
that where evidence of value exceeding the amount prayed for
by an owner is admitted without objection, the pleadings may
be deemed expanded to allow the award established by such
evidence."' On the other hand, such informal amendment is
strictly limited and if the evidence introduced without objec-
tion is not specifically offered in proof of a larger award but
only in proof of severance damages, such evidence will not be
deemed to expand the prayer for relief as to the award.2
Two recent cases juxtapose the Louisiana Constitution
and theCivil Code as alternative sources of jurisdiction in in-
verse condemnation cases. In Key v. Louisiana Department of
Highways," the court found a cause of action directly in the
constitution 4 for the recovery of damages suffered when the
expropriator, in conjunction with a taking for street widening,
rearranged drainage on a dominant estate. The drainage servi-
55. LA. R.S. 19:8 (Supp. 1978).
56. 357 So. 2d 1251 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
57. Id. at 1258.
58. 357 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
59. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 852 and State v. Mayer, 257 So. 2d 723, 737-38 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1971).
60. 353 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
61. Id. at 324. See LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 1154.
62. State v. Terrebonne, 349 So. 2d 936 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
63. 357 So. 2d 1230 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
64. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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tude was thereby rendered substantially more burdensome to
the subservient estate. The resulting injury was compensable
since the property was damaged for a public purpose; 5 a claim
for mental pain and suffering was rejected as an element of
damage not compensable in an inverse condemnation suit." In
another circuit, in Prentice Oil & Gas Co. v. Caldwell,7 the
theory of the cause of action was that the expropriator and the
adjacent landowner, in laying a gas transmission line, had
made a "work" which caused damage to the neighbor;" the
validity of the action was conceded but the claimed damage to
agricultural usage was deemed not proven, and alleged future
subdivision use, as to which a gas line might have been damag-
ing, was speculative." In State v. Smith," the issue might have
been raised, but was not, whether cumulation of actions, as
permitted by article 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should
be used to eliminate the need for some inverse condemnation
suits. The landowner claimed severance damage on several
grounds, one of which was that the expropriator had diverted
a river channel so as to deprive some of his remainders of river
frontage; the court found that the diversion damage resulted
from an adjacent taking and must be litigated separately on
the theory that "in an expropriation suit, the issue must be
confined to ascertaining the market value of the property and
the damage growing out of the expropriation. . . and nothing
else." 7
In State v. Bland,72 the court recognized that while sever-
ance damages should usually be proven from comparable sales,
in the absence of such data severance damages may be proven
by well-grounded opinion as to the percentage loss in value
which is attributable to the taking.73 The burden of proof is,
65. 357 So. 2d at 1233, citing LA. CiV. CODE art. 660.
66. Id. at 1234.
67. 355 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
68. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 667.
69. 355 So. 2d at 1330-33, citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 as basis for judgment.
70. 353 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
71. Id. at 325, citing Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. De Bouchel, 174 La. 968,
142 So. 142 (1932).
72. 355 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
73. Id. at 285.
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nonetheless, on the landowner to prove severance damages by
a preponderance of the evidence where the issue is contested.
Therefore, mere unsupported opinion will not prevail, as seen
in State v. Ruckstuhl,7' where the state introduced evidence to
show that reduction of a residential setback left the subject
residence still exceptionally well-placed and undamaged; the
landowner's unsupported opinion to the contrary was not per-
suasive.
Last term the Louisiana Supreme Court had occasion to
consider the extent of judicial examination of the issue of pub-
lic purpose and necessity when it is raised in a private corpora-
tion taking for a transmission line right of way. In Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. Caldwel,7 it was urged that the trial
court had erred by requiring the landowner to carry the burden
of proof on the necessity of a particular location for a right of
way. However, analysis of the record convinced the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal that the requisite burden had in fact been
carried by the expropriator since the landowner introduced no
evidence to counter the plaintiff's choice of location and only
alleged, without proof, that the decision had been made arbi-
trarily, capriciously, and in bad faith. In these circumstances
the court refused to disturb or upset the expropriator's selec-
tion of a route.7" The Louisiana Supreme Court,77 however,
ruled that the clear wording of the statute authorizing expro-
priation for electric lines "evinces a legislative intent to require
electric power companies which seek to expropriate land to
consider the convenience of the landowner as an element of
route selection. . . . [T]he statute commands that the im-
provements for which property is expropriated shall be so lo-
cated as not to interfere more than is necessary with the con-
venience of the landowners";78 a trial court must therefore not
approve an expropriation unless it determines from the evi-
dence that this is the case. Since the expropriator's evidence
established only the need for the electric line with speculative
74. 348 So. 2d 701, 703 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
75. 353 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
76. Id. at 374-75.
77. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Caldwell, 360 So. 2d 848 (La. 1978).
78. Id. at 852.
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opinion as to necessity for a location contrary to the conveni-
ence of the landowner, the court remanded the case to the trial
court for a determination of the "convenience of the land-
owner" issue as made on amended pleadings by the expropria-
ator and upon appropriate denial by the landowner;79 certiorari
was denied for a companion case where another panel of the
same court of appeal had substantially applied the holding of
the supreme court, and the issue of the convenience of the
landowner had been adequately litigated.8'
In an earlier case, Louisiana Resources Co. v. Stream,8
another of the circuit courts, in a gas right of way taking, re-
jected an attack on what was termed "the right of the expropri-
ator to choose . . . [a] route across . . . [the landowner's]
property."8 The landowner had argued that, where feasible, a
gas line right of way "should be located over lands belonging
to those who have a direct interest," arguing further that in-:
creased costs of such a line were irrelevant. The court, relying
upon, among other cases, Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v.
Bowie Lumber Co.,8 ' ruled that it was well-established in the
jurisprudence that a grantee of the power of eminent domain
had the right to determine the location and route of the im-
provement and that the determination would not be interfered
with by the courts "if . . . made in good faith and . . . not
capricious or wantonly injurious, or . . . beyond the privilege
conferred by the statute."" Despite the holding in Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. Caldwell,8 it is unlikely that such deci-
sions will be disturbed since, with respect to gas line right of
way takings,"6 there is no protective clause such as that pro-
vided by the legislature for electric transmission line right of
way takings that the taking may not interfere "more than is
79. Id.
80. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Caldwell, 353 So. 2d 1343 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 1045 (La. 1978). See Claiborne Electric Coop., Inc. v.
Garrett, 357 So. 2d 1251 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
81. 351 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
82. Id. at 518.
83. 176 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
84. Id. at 740.
85. 360 So. 2d at 850-53.
86. LA. R.S. 19:2(5) (Supp. 1970).
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necessary, with the convenience of the landowner.""7
In State v. Gormley," the trial court took judicial notice
of evidence from its own criminal case docket that a city neigh-
borhood harbored unsavory characters; it concluded that the
remainder areas suffered severance damage as they would be
rendered more accessible to such characters by virtue of the
street improvement. However, on appeal other aspects of the
improvement were deemed to, confer enough special benefit to
preclude severance damages, and the state's objection that it
had no adequate opportunity to rebut such evidence was only
noted as meritorious." On the other hand, in State v.
Terrebonnel0 the scarcity of residential sites in a coastal area
was deemed a matter of such common knowledge that judicial
notice could properly be taken thereof." Where it is clear, as it
was in Parish of East Baton Rouge v. Thomas, 2 that the trial
court based its final decision, not upon personal knowledge,
but upon the evidence presented at the trial, the presence of a
statement in the reasons for judgment based on unsupported
personal opinion will not be reversible error. The court also
noted that while the jurisprudence respecting the role and
function of the trial court does not require acceptance or rejec-
tion of expert opinion in toto, it also does not preclude it; where
the status of other evidence warrants such procedure, accept-
ance and reliance thereon is permissible.93 The trial court is
also free, by virtue of its responsibility to evaluate and accord
proper weight to expert testimony, to determine damages in an
amount to which no witness has testified, but it will not be
permitted to make an award, on the basis of personal opinion,
in excess of the highest value placed upon a tract by any expert
in the proceedings." Thus, in State v. Natchitoches Country
87. LA. R.S. 19:2(7) (Supp. 1970).
88. 357 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
89. Id. at 862.
90. 349 So. 2d 936 (La. App. lot Cir. 1977), noted in text at note 62, supra.
91. Id. at 939.
92. 346 So. 2d 364 (La. App. lt Cir. 1977).
93. Id. at 367.
94. See M. DAKIN & M. Kim, supra note 34, at 398-99 (Supp. 1970) & 126 n.241
(Supp. 1978).
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Club," "knowledge of the trial court" as to value of the land
was not permitted to govern, and the award was reduced to the
highest value as to which there was expert testimony."
95. 348 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
96. Id. at 143. See also State v. Tate, 355 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1978).
